CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIrH AMENDMENT-REGULATORY
TAKINGS DEPRIVING ALL ECONOMICALLY VIABLE USE OF A
PROPERTY OWNER'S LAND REQUIRE JUST COMPENSATION UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CAN IDENTIFY COMMON LAW NUISANCE OR PROPERTY PRINCIPLES FURTHERED BY THE
REGULATION-LUCas

V. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.

Ct. 2886 (1992).
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment expressly prohibits the government from taking private property for public
purposes without compensating the property owner.' Analysis of
this seemingly straightforward clause has resulted in one of the
most muddled areas of the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 2 Initially, the Court's ad hoc analytical framework resulted in a steady trend of government victories, thus denying
compensation to property owners. 3 The Court, however, has re1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
The government's ability to take private property for public use, provided it pays
compensation, is known as the power of "eminent domain." JOHN E. NOWACK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrtUTIONAL LAw § 11.10, at 423 (4th ed. 1991). The
eminent domain concept can be traced to early legal scholars and natural law principles which recognized the government's power to exercise dominion over private
property for the public good. Id. § 11.11, at 424. This power, and its attendant
restrictions, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be applicable to the
states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as to the federal government.
Id. § 11.11, at 425-26.
Early interpretations of the Takings Clause viewed its language literally, requiring a physical appropriation of property by the government in order for a taking to occur. Id. § 11.12, at 430 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887)). A broader view of what constitutes a taking has evolved as well, including
within the definition of a taking a government regulation onerously affecting a
property owner's rights. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)). The attempt to distinguish between regulations that constitute takings and
those that do not has been called " 'the most haunting jurisprudential problem in
the field of contemporary land-use law.'" LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 9-4, at 595-96 (2d ed. 1988) (citations omitted).
2 Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) (noting
that commentators have described the Supreme Court's takings decisions as a
" 'crazy quilt pattern' ") (citation omitted); see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent And Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (declaring that "[n]o matter
how hard or often it tries the Supreme Court seems unable to develop any coherent
principles" in the takings area). The Court's failure to devise a coherent framework
for a takings analysis and adherence to an ad hoc approach to takings issues has
been criticized for leading to unpredictable results which thwart investors' attempts
to make informed property decisions. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A
Comment On Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (1988).
S See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 47475, 476-77 (1987) (holding that statute requiring coal companies to leave certain
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cently begun to favor property owners' rights.4
In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,5 the Court continued
the recent trend of placing restrictions on governmental power in
the takings arena by articulating the general rule that regulatory
takings that deny a property owner all economically beneficial
use of his land were compensable.6 Accordingly, the Court limited the "nuisance" or "noxious use" exception employed in past
Court decisions7 by mandating that the government could justify
a total economic taking without compensation only by identifying
coal deposits in the ground to prevent surface subsidence did not require compensation because the statute was preventing a public harm); Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 116, 138 (1978) (determining that governmental
regulation restricting owner of Grand Central Terminal from building an office
tower above the terminal did not require compensation despite the fact that the
tower plan conformed with zoning laws); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
592, 596 (1962) (declaring that a town ordinance which had the effect of shutting
down a company's mining activity on a certain parcel of land did not require compensation as a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 281 (1928) (deciding
that government statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees in order to protect
more profitable apple trees from disease did not require compensation to cedar
tree owners who could still utilize the felled trees); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
656-57, 675 (1887) (asserting that state statute prohibiting the sale and manufacture of alcohol did not constitute a taking of brewery owner's factory and equipment that were useful only for alcohol production).
4 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828-29, 832
(1987) (ruling that conditioning the grant of a building permit on a property
owner's relinquishment of an easement effected a taking); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 307-08, 322 (1987) (declaring that government regulation temporarily preventing property owner from rebuilding on land in a flood zone would require compensation as a temporary
taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (ruling that any physical invasion of property, no matter how slight, required compensation).
5 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
6 Id. at 2895.
7 Id. The Court had traditionally held that the government could escape the
compensation requirement if it was acting to prohibit a noxious use of property.
TRIBE, supra note 1, § 9-3, at 593. This principle had been broadly construed and
utilized in a variety of contexts. Id. § 9-3, at 593 n.4. (citing cases with varying fact
situations in which injunctions against noxious uses were not takings requiring
compensation); see also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 698, 707 (1986)
(upholding government closure of an adult book store where prostitution solicitation was taking place); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 490,
492, 495 (1916) (validating a regulation prohibiting emission of dense smoke);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657, 674-75 (1887) (holding constitutional a state
prohibition of alcohol); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 665, 670 (1878)
(declaring constitutional a prohibition of animal rendering plant from operating in
a residential area)).
The essence of the "noxious use test" was based on the property owner's use
of his property, not on his dominion over it. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1470 (1978) [hereinafter Zoning]. Thus, if a property use had
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common law nuisance or property principles.8
In Lucas, petitioner David Lucas purchased two residential
lots on a barrier island off the coast of South Carolina for
$975,000 in 1986. 9 At the time, neither lot was encumbered by
any development restrictions.'
In 1988, however, the South
Carolina Legislature passed the Beachfront Management
Act"'
12
which prohibited Lucas from building on his lots.

Lucas thereafter filed an action in the South Carolina Court
of Common Pleas, alleging that his property had been taken
without just compensation.' 3 The trial court determined that the
Act constituted a taking of the property's economic viability and
14
therefore required compensation.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, deferring to
the legislature's finding that the regulation was necessary to prevent public harm. 15 The court held that when a State acted to
an offensive quality that made it "noxious," any regulation of the property that did
not entail an actual acquisition was not considered a taking. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the noxious use doctrine see Thomas A. Hippier, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years Of Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Doctrine.
The Principles Of "Noxious Use, " "Average Reciprocity Of Advantage," And "Bundle Of
Rights "From Mugler To Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653
(1987).
8 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
9 Id. at 2889. Lucas was planning to build single-family homes on his lots in the
same manner as property owners on neighboring lots had already done. Id.
10 Id. When Lucas bought the parcels of land they did not fall within the purview of a 1977 Act which required building permits for construction within a certain "critical area." Id.
"l S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to 48- (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Act].
12 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889. The Beachfront Management Act banned new construction in the area and therefore did not affect Lucas's neighbors who had already
built on their lots. Id. The only construction permitted on Lucas's property was
the erection of "certain nonhabitable improvements" such as small wooden walkways and decks. Id. at 2889-90 n.2 (citation omitted).
13 Id. at 2890. Lucas conceded that the government did have the power to enact
the legislation but argued that the Act had the effect of extinguishing the property's
economic value and therefore demanded the payment of compensation. Id.
14 Id. The trial court determined that when Lucas purchased the lots they were
in a zoning area that permitted the construction of single family-homes. Id. Because the Beachfront Management Act prohibited such construction on Lucas's
property, the trial court concluded, the regulation " 'deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots ....
eliminated the unrestricted right of use, and
render[ed] them valueless.' " Id. (citation omitted).
15 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898, 899 (S.C.
1991). The court asserted that Lucas's failure to attack the Act's legitimacy was a
concession that:
[T]he beach/dune area of South Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new construction, inter alia,
contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and

1993]

NOTE

1843

prevent a noxious use of property, no compensation was due regardless of the legislation's private economic effects. 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court's
determination, finding that Lucas's property had been taken
without just compensation.' 7 The Court enunciated a general
rule requiring compensation whenever government regulation
deprived a property owner of all economically viable use of his
property.' The Court tempered this assertion, however, by stating that such regulation would be justified if it was designed to
abate a common law nuisance.1 9
Mugler v. Kansas20 was one of the Court's earliest attempts to
balance the public and private concerns that arise when government action results in private economic hardship.2 1 In Mugler,
the Court addressed a Kansas act 2 2 outlawing the manufacture or
that discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/
dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm.
Id. at 898.
16 Id. at 899. The court cited several cases for support. Id.; see, e.g., Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 590-91 (1962) (declaring that a regulation prohibiting
excavation below the water table did not constitute a compensable taking of property where the regulation had the effect of preventing a property owner from continuing mining activity on a certain lot); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 28081 (1928) (holding that government statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees
to protect more profitable apple trees from disease did not require compensation
to cedar tree owners who could still utilize the felled trees); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 414 (1915) (declaring ordinance prohibiting brickmaking
within city limits did not constitute a taking of land where the property owner's lot
was suitable only for brickmaking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 654, 675
(1887) (upholding a statute banning the manufacture and sale of alcohol because it
did not effect a taking of owners' breweries).
17 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
18 Id. at 2895. The majority based this assertion on previous Court decisions
indicating that a complete diminution in economic value would constitute a taking.
Id. at 2893. See, e.g. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
(stating that the court has "long recognized that land use regulation does not effect
a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y]
an owner economically viable use of his land' ") (citations omitted); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987) (declaring that regulating property uses "effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable use
of his land.' ") (citations omitted); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance ... denies an owner economically viable use of his land") (citation omitted).
19 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
20

123 U.S. 623 (1887).

Hippler,supra note 7, at 660. One author suggests that Mugler was the Court's
"first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between states' police power and
the due process and takings clauses."
22 The Act provided in pertinent part:
All places where intoxicating liquors are manufactured, sold, bartered, or given away in violation of any of the provisions of this act, or
21
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sale of intoxicating liquors.23 The Act had the effect of shutting
down breweries, including petitioner Peter Mugler's, even
though these establishments had been lawfully operated prior to
the amendment.2 4 Subsequently, Mugler alleged that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by
rendering his brewery practically valueless.2 5
In finding that no unconstitutional taking had occurred, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, examined the scope of the
state's police power.26 Justice Harlan posited that a state's police
where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, barter, or delivery in violation of this act, are hereby declared to be common nuisances, and
upon the judgment of any court having jurisdiction finding such a
place to be a nuisance under this section, the sheriff, his deputy, or
under sheriff, or any constable of the proper county, or marshal of any
city where the same is located, shall be directed to shut up and abate
such place by taking possession thereof and destroying all intoxicating liquors found therein, together with all signs, screens, bars, bottles, glasses, and other property used in keeping and maintaining said
nuisance, and the owner or keeper thereof shall, upon conviction, be
adjudged guilty of maintaining a common nuisance and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five
hundred dollars, and by imprisonment in the county jail not less than
thirty days nor more than ninety days....
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 670 (quoting GEN. STAT. KANSAS, 1885, ch., § 13 (1885)).
23 Id. at 655. The Act was passed in response to a popularly approved state
constitutional amendment calling for prohibition. Id. The Court stated that it was
common knowledge that alcohol could endanger the public's health, morals, and
safety, thus giving Kansas the right to limit its manufacture and sale. Id. at 662.
Justice Harlan noted statistical evidence "that the idleness, disorder, pauperism,
and crime existing in the country are, in some degree at least, traceable (to alcohol]." Id.
24 Id. at 654, 656-57. Mugler was found guilty of selling beer after the Act's
enactment. Id. at 657.
25 Id. at 654, 657. Mugler argued that his building would be of little economic
use if not utilized for the manufacture of alcohol. Id. Justice Harlan agreed with
this point. Id. at 657.
26 Id. at 658. The term "police power" is difficult to define because it is not
embodied in the United States Constitution and its scope has been the subject of
much debate among judges and legal scholars. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 107 (1985); see, e.g., Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that the term police power has no exact
definition). Generally, the police power entails the government's ability to maintain "peace and good order" by protecting the health, safety and morals of the
public. EPSTEIN, supra at 108; see also NOWACK, supra note 1, § 11.10, at 423 (stating
that "the term 'police power' is used to designate the inherent power of government to take acts to promote the public health, safety, welfare or morals"); Sax,
supra note 2, at 36 n.6 (noting that "[iun its best known and most traditional uses,
the police power is employed to protect the health, safety, and morals of the community").
In the takings context, police power is more narrowly construed to encompass
the government's ability to regulate land use and personal property without incur-
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power mandate to protect the health, morals, and safety of its
citizens included the right to outlaw liquor.27 The Justice rested
this assertion on the policy judgment that an individual could not
utilize his property in a manner that injured others. 28 According
to Justice Harlan, the legislature should be given great deference
in determining what property uses would be deemed injurious.29
Accordingly, Justice Harlan deferred to the legislature's finding
of a nexus between the prohibition of alcohol and the goal of
protecting the community. 30
Having established a police power justification for the Act,
the Justice next declared that the government was under no duty
to compensate for losses incurred as a result of such legislation. 3
ring the obligation of paying compensation. NOWACK, supra note 1, § 11.10, at 42324. Thus, the government's police power can be utilized to restrict certain property rights without having to compensate individuals for their losses. Sax, supra
note 2, at 36 n.6. Proper police power justifications have been found in varying
situations. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (permitting the
regulation of brickyards); L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 117 U.S. 587 (1900) (allowing restrictions on prostitution); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659
(1878) (upholding restrictions on the transportation of noxious waste).
For a historical view of early police power theories, see T.D. Havran, Eminent
Domain and the Police Power, 5 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 380 (1930); R.S. Wiggin, The
Power Of The State To Restrict The Use Of Real Property, 1 MINN. L. REV. 135 (1917).
27 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 658 (quotation omitted). The Court supported this contention by noting past decisions standing for the proposition that alcohol could be
heavily regulated. Id. at 659. See, e.g., Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884)
(positing that the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting the sale and manufacture of alcohol was well established); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33
(1877) (noting that laws prohibiting the sale and manufacture of alcohol were valid
police regulations that did not violate any section of the United States Constitution); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 133 (1873) (determining that state legislatures had the power to regulate and prohibit alcohol trafficking).
28 MugLer, 123 U.S. at 660 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876)).
The Munn Court based this policy judgment on the principle that members of society, while free to conduct their private affairs without governmental interference,
were subject to certain constraints when their acts affected others. Munn, 94 U.S. at
124. According to the Latin phrase sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, the Munn Court
explained, government was authorized to establish "laws requiring each citizen to
so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure
another." Id. at 124-25.
29 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 660-61. Justice Harlan placed two limitations on the
state's police power. Id. at 661. The Justice posited that the regulation should be
substantially related to the ends sought and could not invade fundamental rights.
Id.
30 Id. at 662. The Justice further declared that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not restrict the state's police powers. Id. at 664. Justice Harlan asserted that "[it
cannot be supposed that the States intended, by adopting that Amendment, to impose restraints upon the exercise of their powers for the protection of the safety,
health, or morals of the community." Id.
31 Id. at 668-69. Justice Harlan justified the notion that a proper police power
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Refusing to factor in the Act's economic consequences, Justice
Harlan asserted that when a state thwarted a noxious use of
property it was not obliged to pay the property owner for his or
her losses.3 2 The Justice further drew a distinction between the
exercise of police power and the exercise of eminent domain by
noting that a police power action merely limited a property
owner's use of the property, not his right of ownership.3 3
The Court refined its police power and eminent domain
analysis in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon.34 The Pennsylvania Coal Company challenged the validity of a state law
preventing the company from mining coal under certain parcels
of land where subsidence to the surface would occur.3 5 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a proper
use of the state's police power. 36 The court reached this decision
action alleviated the government's duty to pay compensation by reasoning that a
property owner would still have control over, and use of, his property. Id. at 669.
Additionally, the Justice noted that such a property owner would be able to freely
alienate his land. Id. The Justice did observe that if the legislation's "apparent"
objective was to deprive individuals of their property "under the guise of police
regulation" a taking determination would be warranted and compensation due. Id.
32 Id. Justice Harlan's refusal to consider the legislation's economic impact
stemmed from the literal view that mere limitations on property did not constitute a
taking under the Fifth Amendment. Sax, supra note 2, at 36. Justice Harlan rationalized that "It]he exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way,
whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for
public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law."
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. This viewpoint was in line with the common view in the
late 1800's that absent an explicit expropriation of property, the government would
not be liable for a compensable taking unless there was a physical invasion of the
property. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, And Fairness:Comments On The Ethical
FoundationsOf 'just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 & n.36 (1967);
see also Zoning, supra note 7, at 1467 n.25 (noting that " '[i]t seems settled that to
entitle the owner to protection under [the Takings Clause] the property must be
taken in the physical sense of the word' ") (quoting T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 519-20 (1857)).
33 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
34 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a detailed discussion of the Pennsylvania Coal deci-

sion, see FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE, 124-38 (1973); Carol M.
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Test Is Still A Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
561 (1984).
35 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412. Entitled the "Kohler Act," the statute prohibited coal mining where cave-ins or subsidence would have adverse effects on
public or private dwellings, among other designated areas. Mahon v. Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492 (1922).
36 Id. at 493. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that when a statute
sought to protect the public's health, safety, or morals, the statute must be substantially related to those goals to be valid. Id. In so ruling, the court displayed a
highly deferential disposition towards state regulations, stating that "[i]t
is primar-
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despite Pennsylvania Coal's contract with surface owners to mine
under the land, and the surface owners' assumption of all risks
resulting from the mining operations.3 7
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes first scrutinized
whether there was a sufficient police power justification to avoid
a determination that a taking had occurred. 8 The Justice noted
that while the police power would justify certain actions, that
power was not without its limits. 3 9 Among these limitations, the
majority explained, was the extent to which the regulation
worked an economic diminution in value on the injured party's
property.40 With this framework in mind, Justice Holmes
weighed the public concerns furthered by the statute with the private losses incurred by Pennsylvania Coal and concluded that the
extent of the diminution in value required compensation. 4 1
ily for the Legislature to consider and decide on the fact of a danger, then meet it
by a proper remedy." Id. (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
gave great weight to the legislature's statements regarding the public dangers
caused by subsidence. Id.
37 Id. at 492, 495. Pennsylvania common law recognized three separate estates
in land: the surface estate, the subsurface mineral estate, and the support estate.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 395 (Plaintiff's Brief). The surface rights in Pennsylvania Coal were owned by the Mahons, while the Pennsylvania Coal Company
owned the mineral rights and had obtained a contractual waiver of any claim
against them for subsidence. BOSSELMAN, supra note 34, at 130. Thus, the coal
company had the contractual right to undertake mining activity that would destroy
the support estate and cause subsidence to the Mahon's land above. Pennsylvania
Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
Citing United States Supreme Court precedent, however, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court opined that private contracts could not override a state's legitimate
use of its police powers. Id. at 494 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392
(1898)). Noting that a state's police power could be utilized to promote the general
welfare, the Court stated that this power could not be " 'limited by contract nor
bartered away by legislation.'" Id. (quoting Holden, 169 U.S. at 392).
38 Id. at 413. Justice Holmes asserted that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power." Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. Justice Holmes refused to set a formula to determine when an economic
diminution would demand compensation, opining that such an inquiry depended
on a case's "particular facts." Id. The Justice acknowledged that legislatures
should be given great deference in determining whether certain actions fell within
the state's police power but opined that such legislative findings were still open to
challenges by interested parties. Id.
41 Id. at 413-14. Justice Holmes noted that the harm being averted was to "a
single private house." Id. at 413. While admitting that such a situation did carry
some public interest, the Justice posited that since the resultant damage to the
house would not be akin to a public nuisance common to the general public, it was
not strongly affected with the public interest. Id. Furthermore, Justice Holmes refused to accept safety justifications in support of the Act. Id. at 414. The Justice
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Despite the conclusion that a taking had occurred in this particular dispute, Justice Holmes went one step further by declaring that the Act itself was unconstitutional in any situation where
mining rights had been reserved.42 The Justice stressed that
although the State of Pennsylvania had a rational public objective
for adopting the regulation, that fact was not dispositive of
whether a taking had occurred.4 3 The Justice also asserted that
by making it impracticable to mine the coal profitably, the statute
effected a physical taking. 44 This reasoning led Justice Holmes to
assert that states could regulate property, but "if regulation goes
too far ' 4' 5 an improper taking would result.46
asserted that safety concerns could be satisfied by providing the public with advance notice of the mining activities. Id. Therefore, the Justice found that the public concerns were not strong enough to outweigh the private interest of losing a
"very valuable estate." Id.
42 Id. The Justice asserted that it was necessary to analyze the statute on its face
because various groups had submitted arguments calling the Act's legitimacy into
question. Id. Thus, the majority averred, "[ilt
seems, therefore, to be our duty to
go farther in the statement of our opinion, in order that it may be known at once,
and that further suits should not be brought in vain." Id.
43 Id. at 413, 414-15. Justice Holmes declared that "[t]he protection of private
property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but
provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation." Id. at 415.
44 Id. at 414. Positing that " 'the right to coal consists in the right mine it,' "
Justice Holmes distinguished a similar case in which the Court allowed the state
legislature to require coal companies to leave a pillar of coal in the ground between
their respective mines. Id. at 415 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co.,
256 Pa. 328, 331, and citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531
(1914)). The Justice rationalized that the policy behind the Plymouth regulation was
to provide a safety barrier between the properties and afforded the coal companies
an "average reciprocity of advantage" which was akin to just compensation. Id.
While commentators have differed over the exact meaning of the phrase "average reciprocity of advantage," it appears to refer to any reciprocal benefits a landowner receives when he is burdened by certain land use regulation. See Hippler,
supra note 7, at 673 & n. 110. Thus, these reciprocal benefits act as compensation
and thwart a taking determination. Id. Despite the seeming import of the reciprocity of advantage doctrine, it was virtually ignored by the Court until its resurrection
in the dissent in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 673 n.110.
45 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Although Justice Holmes refused to provide a formula for how far is "too far," this phrase has been relied upon in numerous court decisions to determine if compensable takings had occurred. See, e.g.,
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) (asserting
that "appellant must establish that the regulation has in substance 'taken' his property-that is, that the regulation 'goes too far' ") (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S.
at 415); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (stating that
"[w]hen 'regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking' ") (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178
(1979) (declaring that "the Government's attempt to create a public right of access
to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation.., as to amount to a
taking under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal"). The Court, however, has never quan-
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The Court again faced governmental action aimed at
preventing a public harm that affected private economic interests
in Goldblatt v. Hempstead.4 7 In Goldblatt, a corporation had conducted mining activities on a certain lot for over thirty years, resulting in the formation of a twenty-acre lake around which the
town of Hempstead, New York, had expanded.4 ' The town subsequently amended an ordinance to prohibit excavation below
the water table, thus making further mining on the lot impossible. 49 The town sought an injunction to prevent further mining
on the property and the mining company responded by alleging
that the ordinance effected an unconstitutional taking.5 °
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Clark sought to harmonize the police power standards set forth in the Mugler and
Pennsylvania Coal decisions. 5 ' As an initial matter, the Court
noted that although the ordinance had taken away a beneficial
use of the property, that fact alone would not constitute a taking
if the town was validly exercising its police powers. 2 The Court
tifed a certain level of economic diminution in value that constitutes a compensable taking, instead opting to make such determinations on a case-by-case basis.
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 U.C.L.A. J.
ENVTL. LAW & POL'Y 139, 149 (1988).
46 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Justice Holmes asserted that without this
limiting principle government would continue to expand the sweep of its police
power "more and more until at last private property disappears." Id.
47 369 U.S. 590, 591 (1962).
48 Id. at 591. The mining company had continuously mined sand and gravel on
the thirty-eight acre tract since 1927 and had already excavated below the water
table by 1928. Id.
49 Id. at 592. The ordinance provided that " '[n]o excavation shall be made below two feet above the maximum ground water level at the site.' " Id. at 592 n. 1.
The amendment also placed a duty on property owners to refill excavation work
below the water table. Id.
50 Id. The mining company argued that the ordinance did not merely regulate
their business because the law had the effect of totally prohibiting further mining
on the site. Id. This result, the company contended, acted as a confiscation of
property without compensation. Id.
51 Id. at 593-94. See supra notes 20-33 and 34-46 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal decisions.
52 Id. at 592-93 (citing Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinmann v. Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915)). Justice Clark also posited that a property use could be prohibited
even if it was not recognized as a nuisance at common law. Id. at 593 (citing
Reinmann, 237 U.S. at 176).
In Walls, the Court held that a statute placing restrictions on natural gas and
gas wells which had the effect of prohibiting the manufacture of "carbon black" in a
factory exclusively designed for that purpose, was a proper exercise of the state's
police power. Walls, 254 U.S. at 309-10, 325. Similarly, the Hadacheck Court declared that a city ordinance prohibiting brick making did not act as an unconstitutional taking of property where the petitioner's property was best suited for
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then reiterated the Mugler Court's determination that no compensation was required when the government sought to prevent
a noxious use of property that would be injurious to the public's
health, morals, or safety.5" Qualifying this assertion, Justice
Clark noted that the Pennsylvania Coal decision mandated that certain regulations could have such onerous private effects that
would require compensation.54
Applying the principles espoused in Mugler and Pennsylvania
Coal, Justice Clark set forth several factors for consideration
when determining if a state's police power had exceeded constitutional bounds.55 Justice Clark asserted that the Court should
consider the character of the harm being averted, the availability
of effective and less drastic remedies, and the diminution in value
to appellant's interests as a result of the ordinance. 56 These criteria were not actually weighed in Goldblatt, however, because of
Justice Clark's finding that there was no evidence on the record
to determine the potential danger, less onerous remedies, or the
actual economic loss. 57 As a result, the Court deferred to the
government's determination.58
brickmaking. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 404, 414. The Court in Reinmann also held
that a city ordinance prohibiting livery stables in certain areas did not act as an
unconstitutional taking of property simply because petitioner was barred from operating his stable. Reinmann, 237 U.S. at 176, 180.
53 Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887)).
54 Id. at 594 (citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). Justice
Clark stressed that "[t]here is no set formula to determine where regulation ends
and taking begins. Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant...
it is by no means conclusive." Id. (citations omitted). The Justice buttressed this
statement by noting that the Court had previously refused to find that a compensable taking had occurred in a situation where the property's value had diminished
from $800,000 to $60,000. Id. (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915)).
55 Id. at 595. Justice Clark recognized that the Court had used a "reasonableness" standard in the past rather than relying on any specific criteria. Id. at 594. In
order to fulfill this reasonableness test, the Justice continued, the regulation would
have to further a public interest and the means chosen to further that interest had
to be reasonably necessary to achieve the asserted goal. Id. at 594-95 (quoting
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
56 Id. at 595.
57 Id. at 595-96.
58 Id. at 596. In deferring to the government, Justice Clark noted that the party
seeking to overturn a regulation as unreasonable shouldered the burden of showing the regulation's inequity. Id. The Court cited numerous cases stating that governmental regulations were presumed constitutional. Id. See, e.g., Salsburg v.
Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954) (stating that the government had the presumption of reasonableness on its side); United States v. Carolene, 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1935) (declaring that the decision to regulate milk commerce was a decision for
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The next major development in the takings arena took place
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City59 as the Court
not only proffered but also applied several factors to determine
the constitutionality of governmental action that effectively denied certain property uses.' Penn Central concerned a dispute
over New York City's Landmark Preservation Law 6 ' under which

a commission was empowered to designate certain buildings as
landmarks.62 Once a building was designated a landmark, the
building's owner could not make any exterior architectural modifications to the structure without the commission's approval. 63
The commission designated Grand Central Terminal, owned by
Penn Central, an historic landmark in August, 1967.1 Nearly six
months later, Penn Central entered into an agreement with an
outside corporation to build a multi-story skyscraper above the
terminal. 65 Subsequent attempts to obtain the commission's apCongress to make and a court's judgment "could not be substituted" for the
Congress's).
59 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60 Id. at 124, 125-36 (citations omitted).
61 N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976). The Act's purpose was
to, inter alia, protect historic landmarks in order to enhance tourism, foster civic
pride, and promote the general welfare of city residents. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
109 (quotations omitted). In order for a property to be deemed a landmark it was
required to have " 'a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or
value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city,
state or nation.' " Id. at 110 (quotation omitted).
62 Id. The Landmark Preservation Commission consisted of eleven members
and was required to "include at least three architects, one historian qualified in the
field, one city planner or landscape architect, one realtor, and at least one resident
of each of the city's five boroughs." Id. at 110 & n.8 (citation omitted).
63 Id. at 111-12. Such approval could be obtained through any of three procedures. Id. at 112. First, the owner could attempt to procure an order from the
commission approving the desired modifications because they would not affect any
of the landmark's architectural features. Id. Second, the property owner could apply for a certificate of appropriateness that would be approved if it was determined
that the proposed construction "would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark." Id. Finally, a certificate of appropriateness could be pursued on an economic hardship theory. Id. This option tied
into the concept of whether the landmark owner was receiving a "reasonable return" on his investment in the landmark site. Id. at 112-13 n.13. If it was proven
that the landmark owner was not earning a reasonable return, the Commission
would have to develop a new plan to allow the owner to reap the proper economic
benefits. Id. at 113 n.13. The owner also had the affirmative duty of keeping the
structure in good repair. Id. at 111-12.
64 Id. at 115.
65 Id. at 116. Projected rentals for the proposed structure equalled one million
dollars per year during the construction period and at least three million dollars
annually when the office building opened. Id.
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proval for the project failed, 66 and Penn Central brought suit.6 7
Justice Brennan began the Court's opinion by positing that
takings cases should be analyzed on an ad hoc basis. 68 Although
acknowledging that no takings formula existed, Justice Brennan
enumerated the factors to be considered in takings cases. 6 9 First,
the Justice stated that the inquiry should focus upon a regulation's economic impact on the property owner and its interference with his or her investment-backed expectations. 7 ° Secondly,
the majority observed that the governmental action's "character"
should play a major role in determining whether a taking had

occurred. 7

In analyzing the first prong of this takings analysis, Justice
Brennan set forth a number of inquiries to be addressed when
examining a regulation's economic impact.7 2 The majority first
66 Id. at 116-17. Penn Central submitted two proposals to the commission, both
of which complied with the area's zoning ordinances. Id. at 116. The first proposal
entailed construction of a fifty-five story building that would rest on the Terminal's
roof. Id. The second proposal called for exterior modifications to the Terminal's
facade in order to construct a fifty-three story building. Id. at 116-17. The Commission stated that both proposals would have detrimental effects on the Terminal's architectural beauty. Id. at 117.
67 Id. at 119. The trial court granted Penn Central injunctive and declaratory
relief to proceed with construction above the terminal. Id. The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, reversed, stating that the Act was necessary to achieve
the public purpose of landmark preservation and denied Penn Central only the
most profitable use of its property. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29-30 (App. Div. 1975). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding dispositive the fact that Penn Central could still maintain "a reasonable return" on its investment. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1274-78, 1279 (N.Y. 1977).
68 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Justice Brennan asserted that "this Court has
recognized that the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" Id. at 123-24 (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The Justice continued by
stating that "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id. at 124 (citations omitted).

69 Id.

Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
Id. Justice Brennan asserted that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government.... than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
72 Id. at 124-28. The Justice noted that the government had been granted a
great deal of latitude when its laws had adverse affects on private economic interests. Id. at 124. Justice Brennan listed the government's taxing power as one such
example. Id.
70
71
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opined that a property owner's "reasonable expectations" would
play a major role in any takings analysis. 7 Justice Brennan next
asserted that valid police power justifications would be sufficient
to override economic impact concerns in many instances. 4 The
Justice concluded this economic impact analysis by listing specific
cases in which governmental goals outweighed the resultant economic injury.75
Turning the Court's attention to Penn Central's particular
objections, Justice Brennan rejected the argument that the deprivation of "air rights" over the terminal constituted a taking of
property.76 Justice Brennan asserted that the mere fact that a
property owner had lost a certain property right previously believed available was an insufficient basis for a takings claim.77 In
73 Id. at 124-25. The Court described "reasonable expectations," for constitutional purposes, as relating to the property owner's understanding of what constituted property for constitutional purposes. Id. at 125. In Lucas, Justice Scalia
described an owner's reasonable expectations as being shaped by "whether and to
what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2894 n.7.
74 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928)). The Justice noted that zoning laws were an example of this proposition.
Id. (citing Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 388 (1962); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909)).
75 Id. at 125-28. One such instance, according to Justice Brennan, occurred in
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. In Miller, the
Court upheld a statute calling for the cutting down of diseased cedar trees where
the trees threatened more profitable apple trees. Miller, 276 U.S. at 279, 281. Justice Brennan posited that the Court's decision in Miller stood for the proposition
that the government could favor certain classes of property over others as long as
there was an important governmental interest. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 126 (quoting Miller, 276 U.S. at 279). The Justice noted that in Miller the preservation of the
state's apple industry was a proper governmental objective. Id.
Justice Brennan also cited Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), and
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) as examples where government statutes took away the most profitable use of certain property, but nevertheless were
upheld because the statutes furthered valid public purposes. Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 126-27.
TheJustice did note, however, that where governmental action took away all of
an owner's "investment-backed expectations" rather than prohibiting a certain
profitable use, a taking would occur. Id. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922)). Justice Brennan also noted that compensation would be due
where the government was actively using a part of the property to the detriment of
the property owner; for example, low flying planes destroyed property uses on the
land below. Id. at 128 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
76 Id. at 130.
77 Id. Justice Brennan expounded that "[wiere this the rule, this Court would
have erred not only in upholding laws restricting the development of air rights...
but also in approving those prohibiting both the subjacent ....
and the lateral ....
development of particular parcels." Id. (citations omitted).
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rejecting Penn Central's plea to view the "air rights" as a distinct
property interest, Justice Brennan opined that the entire property should be considered when looking at a regulation's economic impact and character.78
The Court next rejected Penn Central's argument that the
Landmark Act differed from valid zoning laws by forcing Penn
Central to give up certain rights without similarly burdening
Penn Central's neighbors.79 While conceding that Penn Central
was shouldering an inequitable burden, Justice Brennan asserted
that such inequity was not determinative" ° and that the owners of
the terminal would indeed be benefitted by the Act.8 '
78

Id. at 130-31. The Justice stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather
both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of
the interference with the rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city
tax block designated as the "landmark site."

Id.
Justice Brennan's view effectively rejected a principle defined by one commentator as "conceptual severance." MargaretJ. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents In TheJurisprudence Of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).
Under this theory, a property owner would be able to sever a piece of property
from the whole and treat it as a distinct property interest. Id. Such a scenario
would then allow the property owner to argue that all economic value in that particular piece of the whole had been lost, thus demanding compensation. Id.
In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist implicitly adopted conceptual severance by
opining that Penn Central's loss of its "air rights" constituted a complete taking of
that property interest. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist recommended the conceptual severance doctrine again in
his Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis dissent, opining that the
twenty-seven million tons of coal that could no longer be mined by a coal company
because a state statute prohibited the mining should be considered as a separate
property interest from the company's other holdings. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra notes 91-120 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Keystone decision.
79 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133.
80 Id. Justice Brennan stated that the Court had previously denied takings
claims where property owners had been uniquely burdened. Id. (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591-92 (denying compensation to mining company
that was prohibited from further mining activity on a parcel of land where excavation below the water table had occurred); Miller, 276 U.S. at 277, 280-81 (rejecting
cedar tree owner's claim that statute requiring destruction of the trees effectuated a
taking); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 404-05, 414 (denying compensation to brickyard
operator who was statutorily barred from utilizing his property as a brickyard). Id.
81 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35. Justice Brennan deferred to the New York
City Council's determination that "the preservation of landmarks benefits all New
York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality of
life in the city as a whole .. " Id. at 134.
Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, focused on the "average reciprocity of
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Despite the Court's traditional aversion to set formulas in
the takings context, the Court did set forth a per se rule in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.8 2 Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, held that government authorization of a "permanent physical occupation" of private property constituted a taking regardless of the public interests furthered by the
occupation. 8 3 The Court required the State of New York to compensate apartment building landlords for the forced installation
of cable television equipment on the exterior of their buildings.8 4
In arriving at this per se rule, the majority provided a laundry
list of cases mandating that permanent physical invasions demanded compensation. 8 5 The Court then provided policy rationales for the rule.8 6 Justice Marshall termed permanent physical
advantage" concept set forth by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal. Id. at 140
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922)). The dissenting Justice asserted that, in this instance, the government
was not preventing a nuisance-like harm that would be dangerous to the general
public's health, safety, or morals. Id. at 144-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus,
the Justice continued, a "reciprocity of advantage" would have to be found to uphold the regulation because it was not preventing an injurious use. Id. at 147
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415). Asserting
that no reciprocity of advantage existed because Penn Central was uniquely burdened, Justice Rehnquist found a taking deserving ofjust compensation. Id. at 14748 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 44 for a discussion ofJustice Holmes's
reciprocity of advantage doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal.
82 458 U.S. 419 (1982). For a detailed discussion of the Loretto decision, see
John J. Costonis, Presumptive And Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For The Taking
Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Steven N. Berger, Note, Access for CATV Meets
The Taking Clause: The Per Se Takings Rule of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 689 (1983); Michael L. Gold, Note, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.: The Propriety OfA Per Se Rule In Takings Claims, 16
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 419 (1983); Ray Mulligan, Comment, Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corporation: Another Excursion into the Takings Dilemma, 17 URB.
LAw. 109 (1985); Valerie Welch, Note, New Per Se Taking Rule Short Circuits Cable
Television Installationsin New York: Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
25 B.C. L. REV. 459 (1984).
83 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
84 Id. at 438, 441. The installation included the affixing of boxes, plates, screws,
and wires to the buildings. Id. at 438. Justice Marshall emphasized, however, that
neither the size nor the extent of the invasion was relevant. Id. at 438 n.16.
85 Id. at 427-31. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116
(1951) (ruling that government seizure of coal mine during wartime constituted a
taking because government took possession and control); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (analogizing low flying airplanes above landowner's property to a physical invasion constituting a taking); St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1893) (stating that the erection of telegraph poles
on public streets merited compensation); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166,
181 (1872) (declaring that flooding of plaintiff's land as a result of dam construction constituted a taking).
86 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-38.
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occupations as the most serious type of governmental interference with property.8 7 Characterizing property rights as the right
to possess, utilize, and dispose of property, the Justice asserted
that permanent physical invasions destroyed an owner's ability to
use property and exclude others. 88 Justice Marshall further
opined that while the extent of the invasion was irrelevant in determining whether a taking had occurred, such an inquiry would
become germane only when formulating the amount of compensation required. 89 The majority concluded by stating that the
holding was extremely narrow and did not implicate the government's substantial power to regulate an owner's use of
property. 90
Thereafter, the Court reverted to the trend of conferring
great latitude to the government in takings cases with the decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.9" The facts in
Keystone bore a striking similarity to the factual scenario in Pennsylvania Coal.92 In Keystone, the State of Pennsylvania passed an
87 Id. at 435. The Justice opined that when the government takes such action it
"does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand." Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444

U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).

88 Id. at 435-36 (quotation omitted). The Court also focused on the "special"
injury suffered when the taking is in the form of a physical invasion. Id. at 436.
Justice Marshall stated that "property law has long protected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property.
To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion
literally adds insult to injury." Id.
89 Id. at 437. The issue of whether a taking should be found has been analogized
to the liability determination in common-law tort actions while the just compensation issue has been compared to the damages inquiry. Gold, supra note 82, at 429
n.52. The Court did not determine how much compensation was due in Loretto,
instead remanding the issue back to state court. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
90 Id. Justice Marshall stated that the Court was merely affirming "the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking." Id. This
assertion, while giving the appearance of being grounded upon a clear mandate,
was not uniformly accepted by commentators prior to the decision. See, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note 32, at 1227-28 (criticizing the physical/non-physical invasion
distinction); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ.
149, 163 (1971) (stating that physical invasions of land should not always require
compensation).
91 480 U.S. 470 (1987). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Epstein, supra
note 2, at 5; Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1988);
SusanJ. Krueger, Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis: Toward Redefining Takings Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 877 (1989); Monique Van
Damme, Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis: A
"Regulatory Taking"?, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 803 (1987).
92 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474-77. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for
facts of Pennsylvania Coal; see also Epstein, supra note 2, at 5 (asserting that "[t]he
social and economic background of both cases is identical.").
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Act prohibiting coal mining in certain areas where subsidence
damage could occur.93 Despite the factual similarities between
Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Stevens, writing for a fiveto-four majority, reached a different conclusion by denying compensation to petitioners who had lost valuable coal reserves. 94
Justice Stevens began the Court's inquiry by noting the hazards
caused by coal mine subsidence. 95 Having established the public
harms the Act was attempting to avert, Justice Stevens next contended that the Pennsylvania Coal decision was based on private,
not public, concerns. 96 The Justice also emphasized that the
Kohler Act, at issue in Pennsylvania Coal, had made the mining of
some coal reserves "commercially impracticable. '97 Thus Justice
Stevens concluded that Pennsylvania Coal mandated that courts
should determine whether the regulation in question was a valid
exercise of a state's police power and whether the regulation
made profitability a commercially impracticable goal.98 Justice
Stevens opined that these principles had evolved into a test
under which a regulatory taking would be found when the regulation did not "substantially advance legitimate state interests, ...
or denie[d] an owner economically viable use of his land." 99
Applying this test, the majority reiterated that a valid purpose justified the Subsidence Act.100 Justice Stevens posited that
a regulation's character played a key role in takings determinations, opining that the Court would be hesitant to declare a tak93

Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77.

94 Id. at 474; Epstein, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that the only difference between

the two cases was the outcome). Petitioners were a group of coal mine operators
and corporations involved in underground mining in western Pennsylvania. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478.
95 Id. at 474-75. TheJustice noted that mining activities could cause damage to,
inter alia, buildings, houses, pipes, cables, wells and underground streams. Id. at
475 n.2.
96 Id. at 484. Justice Stevens observed that Justice Holmes had observed, in the
Pennsylvania Coal opinion, that "a single private-house" was at the center of the
dispute. Id. at 483 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 480 U.S. 393, 413
(1922)). The Justice buttressed the view that Pennsylvania Coal evoked private concerns by pointing out that the Kohler Act did not apply when the coal company
itself owned the surface rights above the mine, while the Subsidence Act in Keystone
made no such distinction. Id. at 486.
97 Id. at 484.
98 Id. at 484 & n.13 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 480 U.S. at 414-15).
99 Id. at 485 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
100 Id. Justice Stevens opined that while the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal was
primarily concerned with safety, the Subsidence Act in Keystone was "designed to
accomplish a number of widely varying interests, with reference to which petitioners have not suggested alternative methods through which the Commonwealth
could proceed." Id. at 486.
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ing where the government was trying to quell a public
nuisance.' 0 ' According to Justice Stevens, this determination
squared with the "reciprocity of advantage" doctrine set forth in
Pennsylvania Coal.10 2 One property owner forced to endure an
onerous restriction, the Justice explained, would be benefitted by
similar restrictions placed on others.10 3 Adopting the general
statement that a property owner could not use his property in a
manner that injured others, Justice Stevens determined that
there was a public interest in preventing the nuisance-like effects
of mining subsidence justifying the Subsidence Act's validity. 104
The majority further decided that the petitioners had not
suffered a sufficient diminution of value in their property to constitute a taking.'0 5 Reiterating that only an owner's loss of economically viable use of his land would necessitate
compensation,' 06 Justice Stevens observed that the regulation
did not completely prevent petitioners from mining coal on any
parcel of land.' 017 The Justice then rejected petitioners' attempt
to classify the unmineable coal as a narrowly defined property
segment requiring compensation if lost. 08 Justice Stevens cited
previous Court decisions that disfavored such an approach and
viewed property rights as a whole rather than individually. 0 9
Moreover, the Court found that the property's "support estate"
101 Id. at 488, 491. Justice Stevens opined that the definition of public nuisance
had been liberally construed in earlier cases and did not necessitate that the Court
determine whether the harm being prevented would have been termed a nuisance
at common law. Id. at 490 (quoting Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928)).
The Justice observed that in Miller, the Court had stated that it was unnecessary to
determine if the cedar trees being cut down by state mandate, in order to prevent
the spread of disease to apple trees, constituted a nuisance at common law. Id.
(quoting Miller, 276 U.S. at 280).
102 Id. at 491. See supra note 44 for a discussion of the reciprocity of advantage
doctrine.
103 Id. at 491 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
144-50 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). See supra note 81 for an explanation of
Justice Rehnquist's reciprocity of advantage analysis in Penn Central.
104 Id. at 491-92 (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 493.
106 Id. at 495 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981)).
107 Id. at 495-96. Justice Stevens noted that while the Act would prevent the mining of twenty-seven million tons of coal, that amount was less than two percent of
the total coal reserves still available to petitioners. Id. at 496.
108 Id. at 496-97. This decision was consistent with Justice Brennan's rejection in
Penn Central of the conceptual severance doctrine. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for an explanation of the doctrine.
109 Id. at 497 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
130-31 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
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was part of the property as a whole and not a distinct segment."°
In a forceful dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with
the majority's determination that Pennsylvania Coal was factually
distinguishable from Keystone." 'I Contrary to the majority's assertions, the ChiefJustice argued that the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania
Coal was aimed at averting public harms and promoting the general welfare. 1 2 The dissenting Justice postulated that Pennsylvania Coal's decision instructed that the Act's public purposes
were insufficient to warrant a denial of just compensation.' "
Thus, the dissent continued, the nature of the governmental purposes behind the regulation would be relevant because the Court
had long recognized that the prevention of nuisances would not
effect a taking.' "4 ChiefJustice Rehnquist narrowed this nuisance
exception by stating that a regulation should have the discrete
purpose of preventing a nuisance."' The Justice added that the
11o Id. at 500. Pennsylvania law recognized the support estate as being separate
from other estates in a parcel of property such as the mineral or surface estates. Id.
Petitioners argued that since they owned support estates, these estates were being
entirely taken by the legislation. Id. Justice Stevens rejected this argument, stating
that "our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions
within a bundle of property rights." Id. The Justice also analogized to Penn Central,
in which the Court refused to recognize "air rights" above the terminal as a distinct
property interest. Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130).
111 Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that the legislative intent of the Act was " 'to cure existing evils
and abuses' " that resulted in " 'wrecked and dangerous streets and highways, collapsed public buildings, churches, schools, factories, streets, and private dwellings,
broken gas, water and sewer systems, the loss of human life....' " Id. at 509
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491,
492, 493 (1922)).
11" Id. at 510 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stated that Justice
Holmes had "made clear that the mere existence of a public purpose was insufficient to release the government from the compensation requirement: 'The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for
public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation.'" Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
114 Id. at 511-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887)). Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that this nuisance exception to the general just compensation rule was a narrow one that applied when
property was misused or illegally used. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
115 Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887)). The ChiefJustice opined:
The central purposes of the Act, though including public safety, reflect a concern for preservation of buildings, economic development,
and maintenance of property values to sustain the Commonwealth's
tax base. We should hesitate to allow a regulation based on essen-
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regulation could not completely destroy a property interest or
take away all of its uses." 6 Applying these narrowing principles,
the Chief Justice concluded that the Subsidence Act was not nar-8
rowly drawn" t7 and prohibited all use of certain coal reserves."1
The dissenting Justice next attacked the majority's unwillingness to classify the twenty-seven million tons of coal remaining in
the ground as a distinct property interest that had been taken. "19
ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that the coal had been taken just
as if it had been physically appropriated and thus required full
0
compensation.12

The Court's historical deference to the government in takings cases began to change just three months after the Keystone
decision with the pronouncement in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County.12 ' In First English, massive
tially economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates of the Fifth
Amendment by labeling it nuisance regulation.
Id.
116 Id. Calling this principle the more important of the two, Chief Justice Rehnquist posited that past cases denying compensation to property owners had all involved situations where the owner was still left with some use of his land. Id. at
513-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887)).
117 Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice declared that while
public safety was a purpose behind the Act, so too were concerns about economic
development and the maintenance of the state's tax base by sustaining property
values. Id. These diverse goals led Chief Justice Rehnquist to conclude that the
legislation was not narrowly drawn simply to prevent nuisances. Id.
118 Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist observed that
the parties had stipulated that twenty-seven million tons of coal would be left in the
ground as a result of the Act. Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore,
the Chief'Justice opined that the coal had absolutely no value if not mined because
" 'the right to coal consists in the right to mine it.' " Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414).
119 Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that
the majority's refusal to reclassify the property was based solely on the fact that the
alleged taking was regulatory and not a physical invasion. Id. at 515-16 (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting).
120 Id. at 518 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJustice averred that when a
total regulatory taking had the effect of a physical taking it was unnecessary to analyze factors such as economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, or the character of the action. Id. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
This was so, according to the ChiefJustice, because an actual physical taking would
not necessitate such an inquiry. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
121 482 U.S. 304 (1987). For a detailed discussion of this case see Epstein, supra
note 2, at 23; Michelman, supra note 91, at 1614; Carol Kirk, Note, First Church
Decides Compensation is Remedy for Temporary Regulatory Takings-Local Governments are
"Singing the Blues", 21 IND. L. REV. 901 (1988); Anne E. Sheppard, Note, First English: The Fifth Amendment RequiresJust CompensationFor A Regulatory Taking, 33 VILL. L.
REV. 925 (1988).
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flooding caused substantial damage to a campground for handicapped children operated by the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale. 2 2 Following the flood, Los Angeles
County passed a temporary ordinance prohibiting the Church,
and other property owners within the flood zone, from rebuilding. 123 The Church brought suit, claiming that
it had been de124
nied all use of its property by the ordinance.
In adjudicating the claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist narrowed
the Court's inquiry to whether the government had to pay compensation for temporary regulatory takings. 25 After positing
that compensation was due when governmental regulatory action
amounted to a taking, 126 the majority asserted that situations
where the government had temporarily taken property were no
different from permanent takings.' 27 ChiefJustice Rehnquistjustified this assertion by emphasizing that the loss of a property
interest for a certain time period could result in great economic
122 First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
123 Id. The ordinance was passed as a safety precaution. Id.
124 Id. at 308. The Church alleged that the county had contributed to the flooding by maintaining dangerous conditions on properties upstream from the campground and by engaging in the practice of cloud seeding during the storm that
flooded the property. Id. The Church sought recovery on the theory of inverse
condemnation. Id.
125 Id. at 313. The ChiefJustice expressly stated that the Court had "no occasion
to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its
property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable
taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as part
of the State's authority to enact safety regulations." Id. (citations omitted).
126 Id. at 315-17. ChiefJustice Rehnquist quoted precedent stating:
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if... it shall be
held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of
real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely,
can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation,
because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the
public use."
Id. at 316-17 (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1872).
127 Id. at 318 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 657 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissenting)). In San Diego Gas & Electric,Justice Brennan asserted that "[t]he fact that a regulatory 'taking' may be temporary ... does
not make it any less of a constitutional 'taking.' Nothing in the Just Compensation
Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable." San Diego Gas &
Electric, 450 U.S. at 657. The majority analogized the First English case to the Court
decisions recognizing the right to compensation where the government temporarily
used and occupied certain property during World War II. First English, 482 U.S. at
318 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, discounted this analogy
by stating that the cases cited by the majority all constituted physical takings. Id. at
331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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hardship. 2 ' Furthermore, the Chief Justice continued, mere invalidation of the ordinance at a later date would not alleviate the
government's duty to compensate for the property owner's loss
1
during the interim period.

29

The majority stressed that its decision would not force the
government to acquire property involuntarily through eminent
domain, thus bypassing the legislature's function in making such
decisions. 130 Instead, the Chief Justice maintained that once a
temporary taking had been found, the government could not
subsequently correct the taking without providing just compensation.' 3 ' Although cognizant of potential problems that the
holding could create for land use planners, Chief Justice Rehnquist nevertheless declared that such problems could not over1 32
ride Fifth Amendment concerns.

Id. at 319 (citation omitted).
Id. The Chief Justice distinguished Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9
(1980), and Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939), as "stand[ing] for the
unexceptional proposition . .. that depreciation in value of the property by reason
ofpreliminary activity is not chargeable to the government." First English, 482 U.S. at
320 (emphasis added). ChiefJustice Rehnquist opined that it would be illogical to
extend these cases to require a given regulation to be held invalid before a taking
could occur. Id.
The Agins Court stated that "mere fluctuations in value during the process of
governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership.' "Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9. The Danforth Court declared that no compensation was warranted during the time when condemnation proceeding was taking
place. Danforth, 308 U.S. at -.
130 First English, 482 U.S. at 321. Chief Justice Rehnquist rationalized that the
government could still amend or withdraw the regulation to avoid a permanent
taking classification, or exercise its eminent domain powers once a taking had been
determined. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. The ChiefJustice posited that "[a]sJustice Holmes aptly noted more than
50 years ago, 'a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.'" Id. at 321-22 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
The Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission completed the
celebrated 1987 "trilogy" of takings cases by ruling that governmental action had
to " 'substantially advance[] legitimate state interests' " to alleviate the government's duty to pay just compensation. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). In so ruling, the Nollan
Court held that such a legitimate interest did not exist where the government had
conditioned the issuance of a building permit to a landowner on the landowner's
relinquishment of an easement across his property. Id. at 837. In Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), however, the burdened landowner conceded that there was a legitimate state interest for the challenged regulation. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890; see supra note 13 for a discussion of Lucas's
concession.
128
129
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Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court continued the recent trend of favoring property owners' rights with the decision
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.13 3 As a preliminary matter, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, opined that the dispute was ripe for judicial review.' 3 4 In so ruling, Justice Scalia
discounted the South Carolina Legislature's amendment to the
Beachfront Management Act that provided administrative remedies authorizing construction on restricted properties in special
circumstances. 1 5 The Justice asserted that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision to render a final judgment in the case,
despite the existence of the new administrative remedy, made the
dispute justiciable. 136 Furthermore, the majority argued that the
case was ripe for review, despite the lack of a finality created by
the existence of a new administrative remedy because Lucas had
suffered an unrectifiable temporary taking during the interim period between the Act's enactment and its subsequent
3 7
amendment.

Turning to the takings issue, Justice Scalia embarked on a
brief historical assessment of the Court's takings jurisprudence.' 3 8 The Justice asserted that a regulation amounting to a
physical invasion13 9 or depriving an owner of all economically viable use of property 40 required compensation regardless of the
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Id. at 2890-92.
135 Id. at 2890-91. This administrative remedy allowed for the issuance of special
permits. Id. The legislature created the remedy following the parties' argument in
front of the South Carolina Supreme Court but before the court had issued its
opinion. Id. at 2891.
136 Id. Justice Scalia conceded that the claim would not have been ripe if the
South Carolina Supreme Court had disposed of the matter on ripeness grounds.
Id.
137 Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). Justice Scalia opined that the temporary taking issue
could be considered even though the issue was not raised in the lower courts. Id.
The Justice rationalized that Lucas never had any reason to address a temporary
taking cause of action, because the administrative remedy did not exist when he was
first arguing his case in the lower courts. Id.
138 Id. at 2892-93. Justice Scalia noted that Pennsylvania Coal marked one of the
Court's earliest recognitions of regulatory takings. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922)). The Justice also acknowledged that takings
cases had traditionally been determined on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 2893 (quoting
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
'39 Id. at 2893 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982)). See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text for an explanation of
Ltoretto's per se takings rule.
140 Id. (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987);
'33

'34

1864

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1840

case's specific facts or the public interests involved. 14 ' Justice
Scalia observed the inherent difficulty in determining when all
economically viable use had been lost, articulating that such an
inquiry might be connected to a property owner's 1reasonable
ex42
pectations as shaped by the state's property laws.
The majority next criticized the South Carolina Supreme
Court's assertion that the Act was a proper use of the state's police power to prevent public harms.143 Conceding that the Court
had previously intimated that "harmful or noxious uses" of property could be prevented without compensation, Justice Scalia
termed such an approach as outdated. 144 Instead, the Justice
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981)).
The Justice stated that "the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation
'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.' " Id. at 2894 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)).
141 Id. at 2893. Justice Scalia posited a number of possible theories explaining
why the denial of economic viability constituted a per se taking. Id. at 2894-95. The
Justice opined that total economic deprivation had the same effect as a physical
appropriation of property. Id. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia further
asserted that when a regulation effectuated a total taking of private property it was
more likely that the property was being taken for the public's benefit rather than for
preventing a public harm. Id. at 2894-95 (citing Annicelli v. South Kingstown, 463
A.2d 133, 140-41 (R.I. 1983); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 NJ. 589, 552-53, 193 A.2d 232, 240 (1963)). Later
in the opinion, the Justice also opined that the public's historical perception was
that land could not be wholly taken without compensation. Id. at 2900.
142 Id. at 2894 n.7. Justice Scalia opined that a property owner's reasonable expectations could be shaped by "whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with
respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of)
value." Id. The Justice refused to implement this reasonable expectations test,
however, deferring to the trial court's determination that Lucas's property had
been left valueless. Id.
143 Id. at 2896-97. Justice Scalia observed that the South Carolina Supreme
Court relied on the Act's legislative intent which was aimed at preventing beach
erosion and discouraging construction near the beach. Id. at 2896 (citation omitted). The Justice noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that this legislative intent, not disputed by Lucas, brought the case within the line of decisions
that allowed the government to prohibit public nuisance-like activities. Id. at 289697 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
144 Id. at 2897. The Justice claimed that if the Court allowed state legislatures to
escape paying compensation simply because they could proffer "harm-preventing"
rationales for their actions, the policies behind the Takings Clause would be subverted. Id. at 2898 n.12. The majority explained that "[s]ince such a [harmpreventing] justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to
a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause
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posited that the proper inquiry would be whether the regulation
"substantially advance[d] legitimate state interests."' 45
Having established the general rule that compensation had
to accompany a government regulation that took away the economically beneficial use of a property interest, Justice Scalia exempted situations where the prohibited land use was not part of
the owner's title.' 4 6 Whether a property interest fell within an
owner's title, according to Justice Scalia, depended on public
perceptions of what constituted property and what power the
government had over that property. 47 The Justice decided that
the government's ability to destroy all economically beneficial
use of an owner's property was not part of this public understanding. 4 8 As a result of this decision, the Justice articulated a
test for total regulatory takings. "'9 According to Justice Scalia,
compensation would be due unless the state could show common
law property or nuisance principles that would justify the desired
result.150 Such an inquiry, Justice Scalia continued, would necesrequires courts to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations." Id. Furthermore, Justice Scalia pointed to the Penn Centralopinion in which
Justice Brennan had stated that courts should not inquire into the noxiousness of
certain uses but should instead decide whether governmental restrictions were reasonably related to a specific goal. Id. at 2897 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978)).
145 Id. (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834). Justice Scaliajustified the abandonment
of the noxious use doctrine by emphasizing the difficulty in distinguishing "harm
preventing" from "benefit-conferring" legislation. Id. In fact, the Justice continued, it would be impossible to make this distinction on an objective basis. Id. at
2899. Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted that no takings case had utilized the
noxious use doctrine where total economic viability had been lost. Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513-14 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
146 Id. at 2899.
147 Id.
148 Id.

at 2900. Justice Scalia analogized this decision to physical takings which
always required compensation. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).
149

Id.

Id. Justice Scalia justified this nuisance exception to the general no compensation rule by opining that:
A law or decree with [the effect of denying an owner the economically
viable use of his land] must ... do no more than duplicate the result
that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Id. The Justice asserted that laws denying permits to either a landfill operation, to
prevent flooding, or to a nuclear power plant, because it wanted to build on an
earthquake fault, would fall within these traditional powers. Id.
150
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sitate an analysis of a number of factors.' 5 '
Justice Scalia concluded the opinion by remanding the case
and strongly suggesting that Lucas should be compensated for
the taking of his property. 152 In addition, the Justice warned that
South Carolina could not simply assert that Lucas's proposed use
would violate the public interest. 53 Instead, the Justice required
that the state identify background nuisance and property principles that would make the regulation valid without
54
compensation. 1

Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, sought to clarify the Court's opinion while expressing reservations about some
of the majority's conclusions. 5 5 The concurring Justice emphasized that the Court was considering Lucas's temporary taking
remedy only and not his permanent taking claim which was made
moot by the new administrative remedy.' 5 6 Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy noted that the Court was not rendering a final decision
on whether a temporary taking had occurred.1 57 Instead, the Justice continued, the South Carolina Supreme Court would have to
determine if Lucas was actually planning to build on the lot during the time when his construction rights were taken.' 58 Justice
Kennedy added that the state court could also consider whether
151

Id. at 2901. Justice Scalia asserted:
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail ...
analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands
and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's
proposed activities .... the social value of the claimant's activities and
their suitability to the locality in question, .

.

. and the relative ease

with which the alleged harm can be avoided through the measures
taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike ....

The fact that a particular use has long been en-

gaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any
common-law prohibition ....

So also does the fact that other land-

owners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to
the claimant.
Id.
152 Id. The Justice averred that denying an "essential use" of land would rarely
conform with common law nuisance principles. Id. (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222
U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
153 Id.

154 Id. at 2901-02.
155 Id. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's assertion that the temporary takings claim was ripe for review because the
South Carolina Supreme Court chose to render a final decision in the matter. Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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the regulation had rendered the property valueless. 5 9 Justice
Kennedy further disagreed with the majority's reliance on com-

mon law nuisance principles in determining whether a total taking was compensable, opting for a broader view of permissible
state action under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 6 '
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized every aspect of the majority's opinion while expressing the fear that the

Court's decision would have grave effects on takings jurispru-

dence.' 6 ' The Justice noted that the South Carolina Supreme
Court had based its determination on two principles: the state's
power to prevent harmful property uses and the presumption of
constitutionality afforded to state statutes. 1 62 Terming these
principles "unassailable," Justice Blackmun cited caselaw buttressing the view that the government could regulate noxious
property uses, without providing compensation, despite onerous
63
economic burdens on the property owner.
Turning to the case itself, Justice Blackmun initially attacked
159 Id. at 2902-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that the
Court was barred from determining the economically beneficial use question because of procedural reasons. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The Justice did, however, express the opinion that the construction
restrictions most likely did not leave the property devoid of value. Id.
160 Id. Justice Kennedy did agree withJustice Scalia's ruling that the public's understandings and expectations with regard to property law were determinative in
deciding whether a total taking had occurred. Id. Justice Kennedy, however,
stated:
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of
the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is too
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society ....
The State should not be prevented
from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations
whatever their source.
Id. (citation omitted).
161 Id. at 2904 (BlackmunJ., dissenting). Expressing the view that the majority
had gone too far by relying on the trial court's determination that the land had
been rendered valueless, Justice Blackmun charged that -[t]oday the Court
launches a missile to kill a mouse ....
I protest not only the Court's decision, but
each step taken to reach it. More fundamentally, I question the Court's wisdom in
issuing sweeping new rules to decide such a narrow case." Id.
162 Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 2905, 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
669 (1887)). The Justice posited that " '[l]ong ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held under an implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community .......
Id. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 49192 (1987)).
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the Court's failure to dismiss the matter on ripeness grounds.' 64
The Justice disapproved of the majority's decision to hear Lucas's temporary taking claim because Lucas had never pursued
administrative remedies that would have allowed him to challenge his property's classification under the Act.' 65 According to
Justice Blackmun, this failure to pursue administrative remedies
66
mooted Lucas's temporary taking assertion.
Justice Blackmun next took exception to the Court's reliance
on the trial court's finding that all economically viable use of the
land had been taken by the regulation. 67 The dissenting Justice
reasoned that Lucas retained several valuable property interests
including the ability to exclude others from his land, 16 the right
to utilize the property for recreational purposes, 69 and the right
to sell the land.17 0 Justice Blackmun maintained that the trial
court had erred by apparently equating the diminution of property values with the complete loss of all economic value, in contravention of the Court's takings precedents. '7' The Justice,
therefore, disapproved of the majority's decision to 72
decide the
case as if a complete economic taking had occurred.'
Justice Blackmun also averred that the majority had incorrectly placed the burden on the government to justify its legisla164 Id. at 2906-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun declared that "the
factors applied in deciding a takings claim 'simply cannot be evaluated until the
administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will
apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.' " Id. at 2907
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S 172, 190, 191 (1985)).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun maintained that the
trial court's determination would be reviewable by the South Carolina Supreme
Court on remand. Id. at 2908 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2908 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun posited that this right
was " 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.' " Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979)).
169 Id. The Justice noted state court opinions ruling that recreational uses had
economic value. Id. (citing Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453 (Me.
1987); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972).
170 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun contended that the land would be valuable to adjoining landowners or other individuals interested in a beachfront lot without a house. Id.
171 Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962)).
172 Id.
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tive determinations. 173 Contending that judicial deference to
legislative findings was firmly embedded in the Court's jurisprudence, Justice Blackmun pointed out that claimants had traditionally borne the burden of proof in takings cases. ' 74 According
to the Justice, this historical burden was shifted to the government as a result of the majority's assertion that state legislatures
could not merely proffer harm-preventing rationales to justify
1 75
onerous property regulations.

The dissenting Justice continued the analysis by questioning
the majority's rule that regulatory takings, depriving all economic
use, should be compensated unless rooted in nuisance or property law.' 76 Justice Blackmun first noted the Court's aversion to
categorical rules in the takings arena. 77 The Justice further explained that the government had traditionally been given great
latitude in enforcing regulations that resulted in severe private
economic hardships.' 7 8 In rejecting the majority's rule, Justice
Blackmun charged that the majority had erroneously concluded
that a denial of economically viable use demanded compensation.' 79 Justice Blackmun asserted that the proper inquiry in
such situations was whether the government interest outweighed
173

Id. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

174 Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.

470,

485 (1987); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594)).
175 Id. Justice Scalia countered this assertion by stating that Lucas had the burden of proving whether he had lost all economically viable use of his land. Id. at
2893 n.6.
176 Id. at 2909-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 261 (1980). The Agins Court asserted that when deciding whether a taking has
occurred, the Court's determination must be based on "a weighing of private and
public interests." Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. Justice Blackmun also cited United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2910
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The CentralEureka Court declared that takings determinations must be based on "the particular circumstances of each case". Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 168.
178 Id. at 2910-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594;
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405
(1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 682 (1888)). See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at
594 (stating that while economic diminution is a factor to consider, "it is by no
means conclusive"); Miller, 276 U.S. at 279 (opining that a statute mandating the
destruction of cedar trees did not constitute a taking because the government could
favor the public interest over private property rights); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 414
(stating that a prohibition on brickmaking was valid despite the fact that the property owner's land was only viable as a brickyard); Powell, 127 U.S. at 682, 687 (upholding legislation outlawing the manufacture of oleomargarine even though
property owner alleged that the law would render his property valueless).
179 Id. at 2911-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the private hardship caused by the regulation.' 8 " If this balancing of interests tipped in favor of the government, Justice Blackmun continued, the amount of value left to the property owner
81
would be irrelevant.'
Having rejected the Court's newly crafted per se rule, Justice
Blackmun criticized the majority's common law nuisance exception. 8 2 By forcing the government to show that the regulated
activity amounted to a common law nuisance, the dissenting Justice asserted that the majority had unnecessarily restricted the
government's ability to prevent public harms. 8 3 Instead, Justice
Blackmun declared that courts should rely on the legislature's
184
determination of what regulations were harm-preventing.
Justice Blackmun concluded by criticizing the majority's assertion that the taking of all economically viable use of property
without compensation was inconsistent with historical public perceptions. 1 85 Stating that such a decision was historically insupportable, Justice Blackmun noted that property theorists and
judges, before and after the Fifth Amendment's adoption, had
not discussed economic viability as being relevant in takings
8 6
inquiries.
Justice Stevens, also writing in dissent, similarly would have
180 Id. at 2912 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181 Id. Justice Blackmun emphasized that "[i]t would make no sense under this
theory to suggest that an owner has a constitutionally protected right to harm
others, if only he makes the proper showing of economic loss." Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 418 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
182 Id. at 2912-14 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 2912-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun opined that the
brewery shut down in Mugler could not be classified as a nuisance at common law.
Id. at 2913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661
(1887)). The Justice further noted that the Court had already explicitly rejected
reliance on common law nuisance principles. Id. (citing Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593;
Miller, 276 U.S. at 280). The Goldblatt Court posited that it was not of "controlling
significance... that the use prohibited is arguably not a common-law nuisance."
Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593. The Miller Court asserted that it was unnecessary to
"weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance
according to common law." Miller, 276 U.S. at 280.
184 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2912-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In rejecting the majority's reliance on common law nuisance principles, Justice Blackmun questioned
how such an approach was connected to the majority's goal of formulating a more
"value free" and "objective" approach to takings claims. Id. at 2913-14 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The dissenting Justice opined that determining whether a total economic diminution in value had occurred in a particular case could not be determined objectively, therefore thwarting the majority's test from the outset. Id.
185 Id. at 2914,-2917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia countered this assertion by stating that takings theories prior to the Fifth Amendment's
adoption were irrelevant, and that Pennsylvania Coal's recognition of regulatory tak-
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dismissed the case on ripeness grounds 8 7 and rejected the majority's new takings framework.'8 8 The dissenting Justice began
by attacking the Court's "categorical rule" necessitating compensation for total regulatory takings.'8 9 Positing that the Court's
precedents had disfavored categorical rules for regulatory takings, Justice Stevens stated that a regulation's economic impact
on private interests was only one factor to consider in a takings
analysis.' 90 Justice Stevens further attacked the per se rule on a
practical level, stating that the rule would unfairly reward property owners who had lost all value while providing nothing to
property owners who had lost practically all of their property
value.'' The Justice also stated that the rule was theoretically
unsound and criticized the majority's various rationales for craft192
ing the rule.

Justice Stevens attacked the majority's nuisance exception
ings had contradicted the restrictive takings views cited by Justice Blackmun. Id. at
2900 n. 15.
187 Id. at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice called the permanent taking
claim unripe because of the Act's newly passed administrative remedy. Id. Justice
Stevens also rejected the temporary takings claim, submitting that Lucas had never
attempted to obtain a building permit either before or after the Act's enactment,
therefore bringing into question whether Lucas was planning to build during the
time when his construction rights were denied. Id. at 2917 n. 1.
188 Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 Id.
190 Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens noted that in Pennsylvania Coal Justice
Holmes had warned against categorical rules and had explicitly asserted that diminution in a property's value was just one factor to consider in a takings analysis. Id.
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 416 (1922)). Justice Stevens further reasoned that while a few previous decisions had opined that a total
economic taking deserved full compensation, such language was merely dictum. Id.
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). In practice, the dissenting
Justice continued, the Court had a long history of upholding regulations despite
the fact that they rendered property valueless. Id. at 2819 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
191 Id. TheJustice also expressed concern that property owners would find ways
to create "specialized estates" within larger estates in order to enhance the possibility of regulatory action effectuating a compensable total taking of that property
segment. Id.
192 Id. at 2920 (Stevens, J., dissenting). First, Justice Stevens rejected the Court's
assertion that a total economic deprivation was tantamount to a physical taking. Id.
The Justice rationalized that partial and total economic takings were equally similar
to physical takings. Id. Second, the dissentingJustice criticized the majority's statement that a total economic taking would arise in rare instances, stating that such a
rationale did not decide whether the decision was constitutional. Id. Finally, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's suggestion that total economic takings carried a
heightened risk that the property owner was being singled out for a public benefit,
stating there was no nexus between a takings result and its purpose. Id.
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with equal vigor. t 9 3 The Justice flatly asserted that the Court's
decision limiting governmental power to common law nuisance
and property principles, in effect, overruled Mugler v. Kansas.'9 4
Justice Stevens further suggested that the nuisance exception
would freeze state common law, thereby preventing legislatures
from updating their laws to guard against newly identified
95
evils. 1
The dissenting Justice concluded by chastising the Court for
ignoring the governmental action's character. 19 6 Justice Stevens
stated that a regulation's character could, in fact, be the most important inquiry in identifying whether particular property owners
were being targeted. 1 97 In Lucas's case, Justice Stevens found
determinative the fact that the regulation did not single out Lucas but applied to adjacent developed and undeveloped lots. 9 ,
193 Id. at 2920-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For support, Justice Stevens noted the
holding of the Mug/er Court, which reasoned that:
[T]he supervision of the public health and the public morals is a governmental power, "continuing in its nature," and "to be dealt with as
the special exigencies of the moment may require;" ...
for this purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion
cannot be parted with any more than the power itself."
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens
opined that the majority's nuisance exception would effectively gut the legislature's
discretionary power to protect the general public from dangers not protected by
the common law. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Id. The Justice explained that legislatures had traditionally redefined property interests to comport with new revelations such as the "appreciation of the significance of endangered species, . . . the importance of wetlands, . . . and the
vulnerability of coastal lands." Id. at 2921-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
196 Id. at 2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens posited that, "(i]t is well
established that a takings case 'entails inquiry into [several factors:] the character of
the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations.'" Id. at (quoting Prune Yard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)). TheJustice asserted that the categorical rule addressed only the economic impact factor while the nuisance exception attempted
only to address an owner's reasonable expectations. Id.
197 Id. at 2922-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, the Justice pointed out
that a regulation having general applicability would be less suspect than a specific
taking targeting certain individuals. Id. at 2924 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens continued, "[in analyzing takings claims, courts have long recognized the
difference between a regulation that targets one or two parcels of land and a regulation that enforces state-wide policy." Id. (citations omitted).
198 Id. Justice Stevens was also impressed by the legislature's asserted goal of
protecting South Carolina's beaches and citizens. Id. at 2925 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice opined that such goals were "a traditional and important exercise
of the States's police power, as demonstrated by Hurricane Hugo, which in 1989,
caused 29 deaths and more than $6 billion in property damage in South Carolina
alone." Id.
194
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Finally, Justice Souter entered a statement declaring that the
case was unripe for review. 199 Deeming the trial court's conclusion that a total taking had occurred to be "questionable" and
based on superficial treatment, the Justice posited that the Court
improvidently assumed that a total economic taking was present
in this case. 200
Commentators' interpretations of the Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council decision have ranged from the view that the case
will have little impact on takings jurisprudence to the belief that
the opinion will have long-lasting effects. 20 1 As is usually the case
when such diametrically opposed viewpoints are expressed, the
truth most likely falls somewhere in the middle. While the majority's categorical rule and nuisance exception will narrow government flexibility in restricting property uses, the case's long
lasting effects may be felt in what the opinion portends regarding
the proper inquiry for determining when a regulation results in a
total diminution of value.
One of the decision's largest failings is the number of assumptions Justice Scalia was forced to make in deciding the case
on its merits. As Justice Kennedy aptly noted, Lucas had never
proven that he was planning to build on the lot during the time
period of his temporary taking and, therefore, may not have suffered any economic injury.2 °2 More importantly, Justice Scalia
relied on the trial court's dubious finding that Lucas's lot had
been rendered valueless.203 These assumptions proved to be ample fodder for the dissenting Justices to attack the majority's
opinion as a zealous attempt at promulgating the Court's takings
agenda despite an incongruous factual scenario.20 4
Nevertheless, the dissenters' fears regarding the majority's
categorical compensation rule for total regulatory takings, and its
attendant nuisance exception, are unfounded. Both Justice
Blackmun andJustice Stevens have written orjoined in past opinions espousing, albeit in dictum, the proposition that a total dim199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Michael M. Berger, Recent Takings and Eminent Domain Cases, in ALI-ABA LAND
USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COM-

PENSATION 77, 79 (1992) (noting that "[c]ommentators are purporting to see all

sorts of things either contained in, or missing from, Lucas in order to justify a conclusion that either nothing happened or something momentous happened").
202 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203 Id. at 2896 & n.9.
204 Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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inution in value of property will generally effect a taking. 205 This
past ambivalence towards the categorical rule that Justice Scalia
adopts in Lucas betrays the dissenting Justices' indignation now
set forth in the Lucas case.
Furthermore, the dissenting Justices' contention that the
nuisance exception will "freeze" the common law and, therefore,
stop legislatures from adjusting state law to comport with changing times is equally disingenuous. While Justice Scalia's common
law nuisance inquiry does restrict government power, it neither
prevents regulation of new technologies nor ignores new understandings of certain uses. This assertion is supported by Justice
Scalia's recognition that a nuclear power plant could be regulated according to common law principles, despite the fact that
such plants are relatively new to the American landscape.2 °6
Justice Scalia's reasoning can better be attacked by noting
the Justice's strict adherence to language in past decisions in
crafting the categorical regulatory takings rule, while ignoring
cases with explicit language in direct contradiction to the newlyformulated nuisance exception. Rather than providing a clear rationale for the categorical rule, Justice Scalia instead provides
only possible theories in its support.20 7 Such a stance could have
been justified under the guise of stare decisis if not for the justice's
trampling of precedent in devising the common law nuisance exception. While this exception has the laudable goal of bringing
more certainty to the takings area, a goal which the exception
may or may not accomplish, it flies in the face of pronouncements in two major takings cases. 208

By taking two divergent

paths to arrive at a final conclusion, the majority leaves itself
open to criticism that the court is more interested in reaching
certain ends than in the means at arriving at those ends.
Finally, Justice Scalia has planted the seed for a new framework to be utilized in determining whether a total economic diminution in value of property has occurred. 20 9 The Justice's test,
205 Berger, supra note 201, at 80.
206 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
207 Id. at 2893-95, 2899-2900.
208 See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (positing that it was of

"controlling significance ... that the use prohibited is arguably not a common-law
nuisance"); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (asserting that it was unnecessary to "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute
a nuisance according to common law").
209 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (suggesting that "how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property" could resolve the
inconsistency in the Court's resolution of the takings problem).
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based on property owners' "reasonable expectations" as formed
by state property law, would be a welcome alternative to the
muddled state of Supreme Court holdings on this question.
While not the type of bright line test that would end the confusion in this area, Justice Scalia's framework would at the very
least allow for some recognition of the conceptual severance doctrine and protect property owners from overreaching governmental regulations resulting in deprivations just short of total
takings. An adoption of conceptual severance would be more
consistent with the traditional conception of property and mark a
sound retreat from the overly deferential approach to government applied in past cases.
Brian D. Lee

